3 for all the causal effects of one's actions.
Moreover, an agent's being agent-responsible for a choice or outcome does not entail that she is morally accountable for the choice or outcome in the sense that she has certain substantive moral duties, liabilities, etc. in virtue of the occurrence of the outcome (e.g., the duty to compensate those harmed by one's actions, liability to punishment, or the absence of duties of others to bear the cost to oneself). That is a substantive moral question that will be answered in different ways by different moral theories. Agent-responsibility merely establishes that the choice or outcome flows in the right kind of ways from the individual's agency. It leaves open what the substantive moral implications are. Although most substantive moral theories hold agents morally accountable only for that for which they are agent-responsible, some do not. 4 In what follows, I shall focus on agent-responsibility for outcomes. Responsibility for choice is, at least on the view I propose, simply a special case-the one where the relevant outcome is simply the occurrence of the choice itself.
At a conceptual level, there are at least three distinct conceptions of agent-responsibility.
On the (Strawsonian) social practice conception, an agent is agent-responsible for some outcome if and only if some kind of reactive attitude (blame, praise, etc.) towards the agent with respect to the outcome is appropriate relative to the norms of our social practice. 5 This view correctly links agent-responsibility with reactive attitudes. I believe, however, that it incorrectly links agentresponsibility to our social practices. We know that in the past our social practices were flawed in all kinds of way and there is little reason to think our social practices are now perfect. Of course, we cannot step entirely outside our social practices, but we can criticize some of themsuch as those involving certain reactive attitudes-on the basis of theoretical reflection upon our 4 social practices as whole. Obviously, the issue is complex and controversial, and I will not attempt to resolve this issue here. I merely flag this conception as problematic and set it aside.
A closely related conception of agent-responsibility is the normative conception, according to which an agent is agent-responsible for some outcome if and only if some kind of reactive attitude (blame, praise, etc.) towards her with respect to the outcome is appropriate from some correct normative perspective (morality, prudence, etc.). This is like the social practice conception in that it focuses on reactive attitudes. It does not, however, privilege our current social practice with respect to reactive attitudes. Instead, it appeals to what is appropriate relative to some correct normative perspective.
A third conception of agent-responsibility is the metaphysical (or ledger) conception according to which an agent is agent-responsible for some outcome to the extant that it suitably reflects her exercise of agency. 6 Unlike the two previous conceptions, this has no conceptual link with the appropriateness of reactive attitudes. Nonetheless, the following plausible substantive assumption makes such a link: Some kind of reactive attitude towards an agent with respect to an outcome is appropriate from a correct normative perspective if and only if the occurrence of the outcome is suitably reflective of the individual's agency. If one grants, as I do, the substantive assumption, then the metaphysical and the normative conceptions are equivalent. I shall be working with the metaphysical conception-although, given the above substantive assumption, this is equivalent to the normative conception.
It's important to note that agent-responsibility is a broader notion than moral (attributive) responsibility. The latter arguably holds only if the agent has the capacity to be aware of moral considerations. 7 An individual with no such capacity may still be capable of reflectively assessing and modifying her beliefs, desires, and intentions. Moreover, she may be quite capable 5 of choosing so as to promote her prudential interests. Such an agent can be agent-responsible for an outcome (e.g., for her sunburn after lying on the beach all day)-even if she is completely insensitive to moral considerations. Moral responsibility entails agent-responsibility, but the converse does not hold. My topic is the more general topic of agent-responsibility.
Finally, and importantly, the fact that an individual is not agent-responsible for some outcome does not entail that her choice is not wrong or otherwise morally flawed. If wrongness is, as many claim, based on the objective consequences of one's choices, then an action can be wrong in virtue of consequences for which the individual is not agent-responsible (e.g., because
she could not reasonably have known that they would follow). Moreover, an individual who is highly disposed to perform morally atrocious acts may have a morally vicious character, but she may bear little agent-responsibility for her choices if they are primarily a result of her genetic endowment and early childhood socialization. (This last claim is controversial. My point here is simply that this is a possible view.)
For brevity, I shall use "responsibility" as short for "agent-responsibility".
Narrow and Broad Agent-Responsibility
Before developing a framework for thinking about responsibility, one further distinction is needed. Consider two identical and identically situated agents, each of whom throws a rock at my window with the intention of breaking it, where the objective, single case chance (propensity) of breaking the window is less than one. 11 In what follows, I focus on broad responsibility. All unqualified references to responsibility or agent-responsibility should be so understood.
Some Background Assumptions
We are finally ready to begin sketching a framework for assessing (broad) responsibility for outcomes. For simplicity, I shall assume throughout that we are dealing with an agent who is making her first autonomous choice. I do this to eliminate any question of responsibility due to past choices. A plausible notion of responsibility will be historical in the sense that one can be responsible for an outcome in virtue of past choices (e.g., for injuring someone while totally drunk in virtue of one's previous choice to have a drink). 12 Here, for simplicity, I set this issue aside.
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In what follows, I shall focus on the mental action of choosing that typically results in physical action. I do this because I believe that choices are the basic object of normative assessment. Such choices need not issue in physical action. Some choices are choice to "do nothing". Although I shall not explicitly address responsibility for omissions, these are, I believe, covered implicitly. Responsibility for omitting to make some choice (or action) is covered by responsibility for the alternative choice made.
In order for an individual to be responsible for an outcome, three general conditions must be satisfied: (1) an autonomy condition: she must make a suitably autonomous choice, (2) a causal condition: the outcome must be suitably causally related to the choice, and (3) a belief condition: she must have (or should reasonably have) a suitable belief that the outcome is so related. I shall briefly comment on each condition.
In order for a choice to be autonomous, the choice must issue from the agent's capacity to reflect upon her beliefs, desires, and intentions and to exercise some kind of control over her intentions. The choice, that is, must be reasonably reasons-responsive. Choices that are manipulated by someone else stimulating one's brain in certain ways are not autonomous.
Choices of a three year old and choices of an agent in an extreme panic are probably not suitably autonomous. Beyond that, much is controversial and I take no stance. Perhaps the agent also needs to have some kind of higher order reflective endorsement of her first order beliefs, desires, and intentions. Perhaps she also needs to "take ownership" of her choice in some other manner.
Perhaps autonomous choice requires the ability to choose otherwise. Because my focus is on responsibility for outcomes given an autonomous choice, I leave open what exactly is required for autonomous choice. My topic is responsibility for outcomes (given autonomous choice)-not free will or autonomous choice.
Consider now the second condition-the causal condition. It requires that the outcome be suitably causally related to the choice. One possible requirement is that, given the circumstances, the choice is nomically sufficient for the outcome (i.e., the laws of nature plus the circumstances plus the choice entail the outcome). This, however, is implausible because it is not appropriately sensitive to the extent to which the choice makes a difference with respect to the chance of the outcome occurring. Suppose, for example, that it is nomically inevitable that it will rain in a given spot one minute from now (e.g., it will rain no matter what I do or anyone else does).
Given the circumstances, my opening my umbrella now is (vacuously) nomically sufficient for it raining one minute later. Responsibility for outcomes, however, does not include-at least not always-outcomes that will occur no matter what anyone does. Thus, mere nomic sufficiency in given circumstances is too weak a connection. 13 Another aspect of the problem is that, even where the outcome is not inevitable for the agent, the nomic sufficiency condition fails to distinguish a case where an agent ensures that an antecedently unlikely outcome occurs from one where she ensures that an antecedently likely (but avoidable) outcome occurs. It fails, for example to distinguish a case of ensuring a flat tire by puncturing a tire that is in excellent condition from a case of ensuring a flat tire by puncturing a tire that is in very poor condition. In both cases, the agent is to some extent responsible for the flat tire, but she is responsible to a greater extent where her choice produced a greater increase in the probability of a flat tire. An adequate specification of the relevant causal connection must, I
claim, be sensitive to the difference that a choice makes to chances and not be based merely on what those chances are given the choice.
I shall assume that the relevant causal connection is that the choice increases the objective chance that the outcome will occur-where objective chances are understood as Those who want to defend a compatibilist account of responsibility will reject the chance-increasing requirement and replace it with some weaker causal condition. For the reasons given above (e.g., to avoid responsibility for inevitable rain), the weaker condition must require more than nomic sufficiency given the circumstances. Fischer and Ravizza, for example, require that the occurrence of the outcome be suitably sensitive to the choice. Their test for suitable sensitivity, however, appeals to what would happen if a different choice were made under certain counterfactual conditions. Like most incompatibilists, I am deeply suspicious of accounts of responsibility that appeal to counterfactual circumstances. I believe that an adequate account of responsibility for outcomes must take the full circumstances of choice as they are. This topic, however, is beyond the scope of this essay. I shall simply assume that an agent is responsible for an outcome only to the extent that her choice increased the chance of the outcome occurring. My hope is that the framework that I develop can be generalized to handle accounts that impose different requirements for the causal connection between choice and outcome. Here, however, I
simply restrict my attention to chance-increasing accounts.
It's worth noting that the restriction of responsibility to outcomes for which the agent's choice increased the chance does not in any way preclude several other kinds of normative assessment. Agents may be (as I believe) strictly responsible (in the narrow sense) for making a choice that they believe will increase the chance of harm even if that chance is not in fact increased (and even if the harm does not occur). 17 This is an assessment of the purely internal aspects of their agency and not based on any causal condition. In addition, the characters of agents who are unable (or insufficiently disposed) to avoid harming others may be judged morally vicious. The moral assessment of character is concerned with the agent's disposition to choose in various ways and not with causal impact.
The third condition for responsibility for outcomes is the belief condition. It requires that the agent have a suitable belief that the outcome is suitably causally connected to her choice. I
shall not address this condition in this paper. Instead, I will assume that agents have true beliefs about the world-and that any other relevant conditions on belief are met. (This does not require that, where there is objective uncertainty, the agent know the eventual outcome. It only requires that she know the objective chances.)
The rough model, then, is this: We consider only cases where agents have made an autonomous choice (where the exact content of this notion is left open). Roughly speaking, an agent is (broadly) responsible for an outcome to the extent that her choice increased the chance of the outcome and she believed this to be so. The rest of the paper is devoted to refining this account. In the remainder of this section, I shall comment briefly on the appeal to probabilities.
I have assumed that, in any given choice situation, there are objective probabilities governing events in the world, including what choices agents make. This is compatible with determinism, since the probabilities may be limited to zero or one. Although I shall assume for illustration that the probabilities are perfectly determinate, this is not essential to the framework.
The probabilities in question may be vague intervals. Alternatively, the probabilities may be radically indeterminate in the sense that the only determinate facts are facts about whether a given event is possible or not. The framework can be generalized to accommodate these cases.
The existence of objective (non-trivial) probabilities is, of course, controversial. The existence of objective probabilities governing the choices of autonomous agents is even more controversial. I shall not, however, defend these assumptions. My goal here is to develop an account of responsibility for outcomes on the assumption that there are such probabilities. If there are no relevant (perhaps vague) probabilities governing choice (and other events), then the framework below is a non-starter. 18 
The Basic Model
Suppose, then, that an agent is in her first choice situation (so that we need not worry about responsibility in virtue of past choices). There were, we are assuming, objective probabilities 13 (including conditional probabilities) governing, in that situation, how the world might turn out.
These probabilities reflect the choice disposition of the agent to choose in that situation and in future situations, the choice dispositions of other agents (now and in the future), and nature's "choice" dispositions (i.e., the probabilities of various non-choice events occurring). 19 We now want to determine which outcomes (events and states of the world) are attributable to the agent's choice and which are a matter of brute luck. The model below will appeal to four distinct objective probability functions:
P i : the initial objective probability distribution over events (including choices) just prior to the agent's choice.
P a : the initial objective probability distribution over events (including choices) just prior to the agent's choice conditional on the agent making an autonomous choice.
P c : the initial objective probability distribution over events (including choices) just prior to the agent's choice conditional on the agent making the specific autonomous choice that she made.
P s : the objective probability distribution over events (including choices) at some subsequent time, s, relative to which responsibility is being assessed.
P i gives the initial probabilities of outcomes. In a given situation, there may be some chance that the agent will not make a choice at all (e.g., have a seizure) or make a choice that is not autonomous (e.g., as the result of overwhelming panic or direct mental manipulation by someone else). If this chance is realized, then the agent bears no responsibility for outcomes in virtue of a choice at that time. Responsibility for outcomes arises only in virtue of autonomous 14 choices. We shall therefore restrict our attention throughout to situations in which an autonomous choice is made. P a gives the initial probabilities conditional on an autonomous choice being made. It seems natural to assume that, when an agent makes an autonomous choice, the fact that an autonomous choice was made (rather than no such choice being made) is not attributable to that very choice. For example, the fact that there was no seizure, no panic, and no direct mental manipulation by another is not attributable to the choice that the agent made (although it may be attributable to prior choices, if there were any). Given this assumption, P a −P i is the shift in probabilities that is attributable to the brute luck event of the agent making an autonomous choice (of some sort). P c gives the initial probabilities conditionalized on the autonomous choice that the agent actually made. 20 P c −P a is thus the shift in probabilities that is attributable to the specific choice. It is the (probabilistic) impact of that choice. P s gives the probabilities at some subsequent time relative to which responsibility is to be assessed. For past events, it ascribes either zero or one, since they are then fixed. For future events, it ascribes the probabilities of how things might go (which will also be zero or one, if determinism is true).
Our question is the following: Assuming that an autonomous choice was made, which aspects of the change from P i to P s are attributable to the agent's choice (with the agent being responsible for those changes) and which aspects are a matter of brute luck (with the agent not being responsible for those changes)?
The following gives the schematic answer, which will be developed in the rest of the paper. ) . If the agent does make an autonomous choice, c, then the shift in probabilities from P i to P c can be accounted for as follows. The impact of the occurrence of autonomous choice (e.g., as opposed to a seizure) is attributable to brute luck and is P a −P i . The impact of the specific choice (given autonomous choice) is the shift in probabilities from P a to P c .
The portion of this impact that was foreseen by the agent (satisfying the belief condition) is attributable to choice, whereas the portion that was unforeseen is attributable to brute luck.
Finally, there is a shift in probabilities from P c (that induced by the choice) to P s (the subsequent probability distribution). As we shall see below, some of this shift may be suitably related to the foreseen impact of choice and thus attributable to choice (known as "option luck"). Some of the shift may be unrelated and thus attributable to brute luck (brute outcome luck).
In order to simplify matters in what follows, I shall ignore the brute luck of the autonomous choice occurring (i.e., P a −P i ). Instead, I shall focus on the issue of allocating responsibility for outcomes, given that an autonomous choice is made (i.e., allocating 16 responsibility for the shift from P a to P s ). For simplicity, we shall assume that, in the given situation, it is certain that the agent will make an autonomous choice of some sort and thus P a =P i .
The remainder of this paper is concerned with determining how exactly the above attributions are made. We shall consider two cases: (1) choice under certainty (i.e., choices fully determine outcomes) with complete and true beliefs and (2) choice under risk (i.e., choices determine less than certain probabilities of outcomes) with complete and true beliefs. I shall not attempt here to deal with responsibility when the agent has false beliefs. The relevant probability functions and probability shifts are as follows, where <.9, $2; .1, $1> represents a 90% chance of $2 and 10% chance of $1: The initial situation, that is, was <.9, $2; .1, $1>. The agent's choice shifted this to <1.0, $2; 0.0, $1> (i.e., $2 for sure). Because this is a case of choice under certainty, there is no luck in how things turn out once the choice is made. Thus, P s is the same as P c. When we examine choice under risk, this will cease to be so.
The model analyzes this as follows:
Attributable to Attributable to Choice Brute Luck
Initial Situation n/a <.9, $2; .1, $1> Impact of Choice <.1, $2; −.1, $1> n/a
Outcome Luck n/a n/a
Total Outcome (at s) <.1, $2; −.1, $1> <.9, $2; .1, $1>
Example 1
The initial situation is clearly a matter of brute luck, since the agent has made no prior choices.
Given that the agent has complete and true beliefs, the impact of choice-the shift in the probabilities due to choice-is clearly attributable to choice. Given that there is no outcome luck (choice under certainty), that's all there is. The final outcome of $2 thus consists of brute luck of <.9, $2; .1, $1> (the initial probability distribution) and the impact of choice of <.1, $2; −.1, $1>.
The two add up to <1.0, $2; 0.0, $1>, which is the final outcome of $2 for certain. 22 In this case, the impact of choice is relatively small (.1 shift), since the agent was, as a matter of initial brute luck, highly disposed to make the choice in question. By contrast, if, in the above situation, the agent chose not to make the loan, the impact of choice would be <−.9, $2; .9, $1>, which is a large shift from the initial situation. In this case, the outcome of $1 consists of brute luck of <.9, $2; .1, $1> (same as before) and the impact of choice of <−.9, $2; .9, $1>. Note that the two add up to <0.0, $2; 1.0, $1>, which is the final outcome of $1 for certain.
The basic idea is that the agent's initial situation (including her initial choice disposition)
is a matter of brute luck. The difference that her choice makes to the situation (and only that difference) is attributable to her choice.
An important aspect of this model is that it views responsibility for an outcome as a matter of degree-as reflected in probability shifts. Responsibility for an outcome is not an allor-nothing affair. An agent can be partly responsible for her lung cancer (due to her choice to smoke) without being fully responsible (e.g., due to genetic vulnerability). Indeed, although it has generally been recognized that the responsibility/brute luck distinction must come in degrees, to the best of my knowledge, the proposed model is the first philosophical account to capture this feature. I claim that it does so in an appropriate manner. (An agent can also be partially responsible for an outcome due to partial autonomy of choice or less then full beliefs. I do not address these issues here.)
Given our (controversial) framework assumption that agents are responsible only for outcomes for which their choice increases the probability, the above model may seem relatively uncontroversial in the case of choice under certainty with complete and true beliefs. Let us, however, pause to consider some of its (sometimes controversial) implications.
The model assumes that an agent is responsible for an outcome only to the extent that her choice increased the probability of the outcome. This entails that an agent is to some extent responsible for an outcome only if her choice was not determined by prior events. For, if her choice was already determined by prior events, its occurrence did not alter the probabilities of any events (p c would equal p i ). Both the choice and the outcome are simply common effects of the prior events, given the laws of nature. The occurrence of the choice does not alter the probability of the outcome. This is not to deny that the outcomes might have been quite different had the agent made a different choice. This thought, however, appeals to a possibility that is, given the circumstances, nomically impossible. If a choice is determined by prior events, given the laws of nature, then there is no nomic possibility, just prior to her choice, of her choosing otherwise. As indicated above, I here assume that responsibility in virtue of a given choice is based on the full facts just prior to choice. This is, of course, a controversial assumptiongenerally endorsed by incompatibilists and generally rejected by compatibilists, but once it is made, the incompatibility of responsibility with full prior determination of choice follows immediately. I shall not here attempt to defend the more general assumption.
As just noted, the model rules out responsibility in virtue of a choice when the choice was fully determined by prior events. A second feature of the model is that it holds that an agent can be responsible when the choice is not fully determined by prior events. It thus faces the following standard objection. Given that the choice was not determined by prior events, its occurrence seems random or arbitrary. It is implausible, it is claimed, that an agent can be responsible for an outcome in virtue of some random or arbitrary event. 23 The objection is well known-as is its reply. The reply is that the fact that a choice was not fully determined by prior events does not entail that it is arbitrary or random in any sense that undermines responsibility.
One of the conditions for responsibility is that the choice be made autonomously. Although the proposed model treats the agent's initial situation-and her choice-making and choice-implementing capacities, in particular-as a matter of brute luck, this leaves room for outcomes being primarily attributable to choices. It is true that the model has the implication that where the agent was antecedently highly disposed to make a certain choice, she bears only a little responsibility for the choice and its outcomes. This may seem to leave too little room for responsibility, but this is not so. First, as indicated earlier, where the agent is antecedently highly disposed to make a certain choice and she makes a different choice, the model entails that she is highly responsible. Second, in real life, agents have lots of options, and the probabilities may not be typically highly focused on any one choice (e.g., there may be 10 choices with probability 10% each). This increases the room for attributability to choice. Finally, and most importantly, even if an agent always chooses that which she is antecedently highly disposed to choose, she may still bear, on the proposed model, significant responsibility for the outcomes. This is because responsibility is historical: one bears responsibility for outcomes-not only in virtue of one's current choice but also-in virtue of one's past choices. For simplicity in this paper, we are focusing on cases where the agent has made no prior choices. Here I temporarily drop this assumption so as to comment on the role that history of choice can play.
Suppose that, for 32 seconds, at each second an agent faces a choice between pushing a small button and pushing a big button. If she pushes the small button at any point, she receives $1 at the end of the game and faces no further choices until then. If she pushes the big button 32 times in a row, then she wins $1000. At each point, her disposition is 90% to push the big button 22 and 10% to push the small button. Suppose that she pushes the big button each time and wins $1000. Here her initial brute luck gives her a (.9) 32 chance of $1000 and a 1− (.9) 32 chance of $1. This is roughly a 4% chance of $1000 and a 96% chance of $1. Thus, the net result of her 32 choices is to shift the probability of $1000 from 4% to 100%. This is a significant attribution of responsibility, even though each of the 32 choices had only a small impact (e.g., on average involved a shift of only 3%). The general point is that, even if the initial situation highly disposes an agent to choose in certain ways and the agent so chooses (which minimizes the impact of choice), if there are enough choices of the right sort in the past, the net impact of all choices can swamp the impact of initial brute luck. That is, although the agent may bear only slight responsibility for an outcome in virtue of any given choice, there may be sufficiently many such choices so that the agent bears significant responsibility for the outcome (in virtue of all her choices). Moreover, in the example just given, for simplicity, I did not appeal to the way in which one's past choices can influence one's later choice dispositions (by helping shape one's character). When this is factored in, the effect of past choices can be even more pronounced. 25 A fourth feature of the model concerns how it handles threats and offers-such as the threat that one will be killed if one does not hand over one's wallet. Sometimes, threats may be so overwhelming that they prevent the possibility of an autonomous choice (e.g., where the agent goes into an overwhelming panic). In such cases, threats do indeed eliminate any responsibility for the outcome and the model recognizes this. In many cases, however, they do not. Even here, however, sometimes, a credible extreme threat (e.g., to kill one) may make it virtually certain that the agent perform the desired action. When this is so, and the agent complies, she is responsible at most for only a very small shift of probabilities. Not all cases of threats, however, undermine autonomous choice or make it virtually certain what the agent will choose. For 23 example, a credible threat that one will be slapped if one does not hand over one's wallet typically has little impact on one's choice disposition and the threatened agent can be responsible for perhaps a significant shift in probabilities if she hands over her wallet. This is not, of course, to deny that the slapped agent was wronged by the slapping threatener and is owed compensation. It is just to insist that the agent bears some responsibility for the outcome as compared with a similarly situated agent who did not hand over his wallet. In short, the proposed model views the shift in the disposition to choose as a result of a coercive threat as a matter of brute luck. The agent is nonetheless responsible (given we are here assuming complete and true beliefs) for the shift in probabilities from that new disposition that her choice induces. This seems to recognize appropriately that threats typically reduce responsibility without eliminating it. Similar comments apply to offers. On the proposed model, there is no difference between the two with respect to responsibility (which is not to claim that there is no difference with respect to moral permissibility and moral accountability).
A fifth feature of the model concerns how it handles causal overdetermination-where one or more agents independently make choices each of which independently makes it a certainty that some outcome will occur. Suppose, for example, that you and I each fire a gun, at close range, at Victim. Each of our bullets strikes his heart, thereby ensuring his death. Who is responsible for his death and to what extent? If our choices were fully determined (i.e., with probability 1) by the laws of nature and past events (e.g., if determinism is true), then neither of our choices had any effect on the probability of Victim's death. The proposed model thus holds that neither of us is responsible for the death. Let us therefore suppose that neither of our choices was determined by prior events. On the proposed model, we shall now see, the temporal order of the choices is crucial for assessing responsibility.
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Suppose that I choose to fire first and increase the probability of Victim's death by gunshot at this time from 1% to 100%. I am responsible for this 99% increase. When you later choose to fire, it is already causally determined that Victim will die by gunshot at this time.
Thus, you bear no responsibility for that event. Of course, you bear responsibility for intending to kill him, for firing your gun at him, and for your bullet striking his heart. You are not, however, responsible for his death. 26 Suppose, now, that we choose to fire our guns simultaneously. Here, the proposed model holds that we may each be responsible for an increase from, for example, roughly 2% to 100% in the probability of Victim now dying from gunshot. Suppose prior to my (and your) choice to fire, there was a 1% chance that I would shoot Victim, a 1% chance that you would choose to fire, and no chance of Victim being shot by other means. Thus, just prior to our choosing to fire, there was a 1.99% chance that Victim would then be shot (.99% chance of being shot only by me,
.99% chance of being shot only by you, and .01% chance of being shot by both) 27 . We each fire and Smith dies. We are each responsible for increasing the chance of his dying now by gunshot from 1.99% to 100%. This may seem like double-counting, but it is not. We do not add the roughly 98 percentage point increases. Rather, it is simply that, for each of us, relative to the facts just prior to our choice (which include the very low disposition of each to choose to fire), our choice to fire increases the chance of Victim then dying by gunshot by about 98 percentage points. We are each almost fully responsible for his death, and that seems quite right.
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Several of these features of the model are controversial. If, however, one accepts that the relevant causal condition for responsibility is the probability-increasing requirement, then the implications seem quite plausible. My goal here is to develop an account of partial responsibility for outcomes and for concreteness I assume the probability-increasing requirement (which I 25 believe plausible). My hope is that similar ideas about partial responsibility can be developed for other causal requirements, but that project is beyond the scope of this paper.
So far, we have only considered the case of choice under certainty (no outcome luck). Let us now turn to the more complex case involving choice under risk (where the outcome is not fully determined by choice). We continue to assume full true beliefs.
Choice under Risk with Complete and True Beliefs
Suppose that an agent has, at the time of her choice, complete and true beliefs about the world but her choices do not fully determine the outcomes. Instead, her choices only determine the probabilities of outcomes. The final outcome depends on what other events and choices occur.
Because, at the time of her choice, the only facts about how things will turn out, if she makes a given choice, are probabilistic facts, the agent knows these facts, but she does not know how things will turn out tout court. The relevant probability functions and probability shift functions are as follows: Unlike the case under certainty, P s (the subsequent situation) is different from P c (the probability distribution induced by the choice). This is because there is outcome luck in how things turn out relative to the choice. The impact of the choice, P c −P i , was to increase the chance of buying a lottery ticket from 90% (the initial disposition) to 100%. 29 The resulting probability distribution, P c , was the 1% chance of ending with $200 and the 99% chance of ending with $0.
The outcome luck, P s −P c , increased the chance of ending with $200 from 1% to 100%. The total impact of the initial situation, P i , the impact of choice, P c −P i , and outcome luck, P s −P c , is P s , the subsequent situation (i.e., $200 for certain).
We must now ask the question of how the total outcome luck-<. The proportional allocation of outcome luck to choice and brute luck is, I believe, highly plausible. It has, however, one implication that is generally rejected. Suppose that there are two identical agents in the above situation, both choose to buy lottery tickets, but only one wins. The generally accepted view is that, given that there was background equality, the outcome luck is entirely attributable to choice (option luck). The above model, however, says that the outcome luck is only partially attributable to choice. Indeed, in the above example (where the individuals were 90% disposed to buy the lottery tickets), it says that only 10% of the outcome luck is attributable to choice. 30 We can make this more concrete by applying brute luck egalitarianism to the example. It holds that the net advantage of brute luck should be equalized but that the net advantage from choice need not be equalized. For illustration, I will assume that the value of probability distributions and of probability shifts is based on their expected monetary value. The two agents had the same initial brute luck; so we can focus on outcome brute luck. Because 90% of the outcome luck is attributed to brute luck (given the initial 90% disposition to buy the ticket), the first agent (as noted above) has brute outcome luck of <.891, $200; −.891, $0>, which has an expected value of $178.2. The second agent (who bought a ticket but won nothing) had total outcome luck of <−.01, $200; .01, $0>. Given the 90% initial choice disposition, 90% of this is attributable to brute luck, which yields <−.009, $200; .009, $0>, which has an expected value of −$1.8. Thus, the total outcome brute luck for the two of them is $176.4 and a transfer of $90 from the first to the second agent is required to equalize their outcome brute luck advantage (giving them each $88.2.) The common view of brute luck egalitarians, however, is that, given the background equality, the difference in outcome is entirely attributable to choice and no transfers are required to equalize brute luck.
I believe that the model is correct and that the common view is mistaken. Both views agree that, for choices under certainty, if the initial situations are equal, then all differences in outcome are attributable to choice. For example, in the example of the previous section (where each of two agents are 90% disposed to make a loan and end with $2 and 10% disposed to simply keep their $1), their initial situation is equal (<.9, $2; .1, $1>, the impact of making the loan is <.1, $2; −.1, $1>, and the impact of not making the loan is <−.9, $2; .9, $1>. One agent makes the loan (and ends with $2) and the other doesn't (and ends with $1). The difference between the two impacts of choice is <1.0, $2; −1.0, $1>, which fully accounts for the $1 difference in the two outcomes. Thus, the model fully agrees with the common view when choice is under certainty. The issue here concerns choice under risk. The question is how outcome luck should be apportioned between choice and brute luck. Given that in this section we are here assuming complete and true beliefs, the question is how outcome luck should be apportioned on the basis of the foreseen impact of choice and the brute luck initial situation.
To help see the superior plausibility of the model over the common view, consider a different example. Here two identically situated agents (with complete and true beliefs) choose which of two paths to take, each is 99% disposed to take the short path, and each chooses the short path. Moreover, on the short path, there is a .01% chance of being attacked by thugs but no chance of such an attack on the long path. One agent is attacked, and the other is not. According to the common view, because there was background equality and each agent chose in full awareness of the chance of being attacked by thugs, the difference in outcome luck is entirely attributable to choice. If, however, each agent was 100% (as opposed to 99%) disposed to take the short path (e.g., because the longer path was blocked by a landslide), then the common view (at least among incompatibilists) is that the entire outcome (including outcome luck) is due to brute luck (since there was no real choice). It is, however, quite implausible, that a small difference in dispositions to choose should convert outcome luck from being entirely attributable to choice to being entirely attributable to brute luck.
The proposed account does not have this problem. It agrees that, where the initial choice disposition was 100%, then the outcome luck (and indeed the entire outcome) is entirely attributable to brute luck. It holds, however, (1) that where the initial choice disposition was 99%, outcome luck is 99% attributable to brute luck, and (2) that where the disposition was 1%, outcome luck is 1% attributable to brute luck. In sum, the proposed view agrees with the common view that, where there is equality of initial brute luck and there is no outcome luck, then the differences in outcome are entirely attributable to choice. Where there is outcome luck, however, it holds that the outcome luck must be apportioned between choice and brute luck and not merely attributed entirely to choice-even where there is background brute luck equality.
Although I have not said enough to establish the superiority of the proposed account with 30 respect to this issue, I hope that I have said enough to establish that it is not clearly inferior and is worthy of further consideration.
Conclusion
I have addressed the issue of partial responsibility for outcomes where an agent's choice is just one of the factors leading to the outcome. In order to make the discussion manageable, I made a number of specific, but controversial, assumptions. In particular, I assumed that one is responsible for an outcome only to the extent that one increases its objective probability.
Obviously, many people will reject this or other of my assumptions. My hope, however, is that some of the central claims of the paper (perhaps with modification) will remain valid in the context of alternative assumptions. I have not, however, argued for this.
Partial responsibility due to partial causal responsibility, I have suggested, can be accounted for by the extent of the shift in the objective probability of the outcome in question.
The baseline for the shift, on the proposed model, is the prior probability distribution over outcomes conditional on an autonomous choice being made (as opposed to no choice and as opposed to some [perhaps, non-autonomous] choice being made). Such a view, I argued, is appropriately sensitive to the agent's prior choice disposition, which, for the first choice, is a matter of brute luck. Choice dispositions, of course, can be influenced by prior choices and a full account of responsibility for outcomes must factor that in. For simplicity, I have focused on cases where the agent is making her first choice.
My goal has been to open up a framework for investigation and not to conclusively defend it. The proposed model is schematic and full of unresolved issues. Still, I hope that it has enough promise to warrant further investigation. 27 The chance of being shot by only me is the probability of my firing (.01) times the probability of your not firing (.99), or .0099 (i.e., .99%). The calculation is the same for the chance of being shot only by you. The probability of being shot by both is the probability of my firing (.01) times the probability your firing (.01), or .0001 (i.e., .01%). 29 It's worth noting that if the agent makes a choice that has no impact on the probability of outcomes, i.e., where P c =P i , then the agent has no causal impact and bears no responsibility for any outcome.
30 I thank Chris Beltram for identifying this implication.
